cles, therefore, in the most moderate and reasonable tone, Bediuzzaman particularly sought to allay fears about the Society, explaining it in the terms described above. Three of his later articles, appearing between 31 March 1909 and 15 April, specifically answered criticisms, misgivings, and questions concerning it. The final two instalments of the third, "Dispelling Doubts in the Light of the Truth," appeared after the 31st March Incident had broken out, and this article was given as a further reason for his being arrested and sent before the Court Martial. As for Derviş Vahdetî, he was accused and found guilty of inciting the rebellion, and was hanged along with twelve others on 19 July 1909. [^180] Indeed, the Committee of Union and Progress well and truly took their revenge: the total numbers executed were two hundred and thirty-seven. [^181]

[^180]:S. Albayrak, S. 31 Mart, 118.

[^181]:Cemal Kutay, 31 Mart İhtilalinde Abdülhamid, Istanbul 1977, 59.

#### Background to the Revolt

Background to the Revolt

The CUP considered the 31st of March Incident to be a reactionary movement and held Sultan Abdulhamid responsible for it, but on the contrary, all the evidence points to the reverse being true, that the CUP at least had a finger in it. [^182] It is beyond the scope of this book to examine the Incident in detail, but since both it and Bediuzzaman's role in it have been consistently misrepresented, we shall attempt to give a clearer perspective by including the following brief outline of its main causes and the course of events.

[^182]:Y. Bahadıroğlu, Osmanlı Padişahları Ansiklopedisi, iii, 746.

As has already been noted, when the high hopes and expectations engendered by the proclamation of the Constitution were not realized, there was widespread disappointment and dissatisfaction, particularly among Muslims who themselves received few benefits but saw the minorities using the new freedom to pursue their own interests at the expense of the Empire. Disenchantment with the CUP increased daily as its true colours became more and more evident.

Remaining in the background, the CUP was not an official political party, neither were its members responsible to anyone. They were in power, but indirectly. Furthermore, in contrast with Abdulhamid, they were inexperienced and their refusal to admit to this contributed directly to the immediate loss of territory and the speedy demise of the Empire. Censorship was abolished. The CUP began a relentless attack on the Sultan in